1	weight. Do you see that?
2	A Yes.
3	Q And that would be a highly rivalrous good;
4	correct?
5	MR. SEIVER: I'm going to object. It may
6	be depicted that way on the chart. I don't know if
7	he's trying to have her authenticate this chart as
8	being an accurate
9	JUDGE SIPPEL: I'm not altogether clear
10	what the purpose of this is, either. I'm having
11	enough trouble with pole space. Now we're going with
12	wheat and fish.
13	(Laughter.)
14	JUDGE SIPPEL: I know what you are trying
15	to do, but I think that Ms. Kravtin I think she has
16	explained this pretty well in her testimony of how she
17	views rivalrous and nonrivalrous. If you've got I
18	think you may have another point that you're trying to
19	make here.
20	MR. LANGLEY: I do, Your Honor, and if I
21	could ask just a couple more questions, I'll leave
22	this.

1	JUDGE SIPPEL: All right.
2	BY MR. LANGLEY:
3	Q Ms. Kravtin, in this chart at least wheat
4	is on the highly rivalrous side of the chart; correct?
5	A Well, it's on the low nonrivalrous side,
6	as this author has chosen to present this paradigm.
7	Q And then on the other side of the chart,
8	the high nonrival good is the national defense?
9	A Yes.
10	Q And, Ms. Kravtin, where on that chart
11	would you place pole space?
12	MR. SEIVER: I would object. Now he's
13	trying to turn this chart into expert testimony for
14	himself. If he wants to bring his own expert to come
15	in and testify as to where it goes, that's fine; but
16	to ask Ms. Kravtin, for the first time having seen the
17	document, that she's and a chart she hasn't used,
18	hasn't relied on, hasn't testified about, to make it
19	part of this case and the evidence in her testimony is
20	improper.
21	MR. LANGLEY: Your Honor, if I can
22	authenticate the chart through her, then I'm still

entitled to cross-examine her on it. She said as an economist that she understands what this chart represents.

JUDGE SIPPEL: I'll take this to be, at least a good part of it, in connection with a <u>voir</u> dire, if I'm saying that right.

MR. LANGLEY: You probably are.

JUDGE SIPPEL: Let's see if we can get a - I'm not going to require you to answer, but can you
answer that question?

THE WITNESS: Well, I can certainly speak to my opinion as to the nonrivalrousness and the exclusion properties of poles because I believe I do that in my testimony. Because I have testimony that testified -- excuse me -- that has а general proposition, and this is certainly consistent with the discussion in the APCo decision, that poles tend to be of a nonrivalrous condition, and that poles tend to be as provisioned by Gulf in a situation where others do not have to be excluded because the whole basis of the APCo decision is to look at more or less the exceptions to that rule. Where can we identify

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1	situations where there is a rivalrous condition on the
2	pole, and that there has been exclusion.
3	And my testimony also addresses those
4	exceptions or cases where you could identify that you
5	could put pole space more toward the left lower right-
6	hand corner.
7	But for the most part, it would go to the
8	upper right-hand quadrant, but there would be
9	conditions, there would be conditions under which that
10	pole could be considered in the lower toward the
11	lower left, and those are conditions that would
12	satisfy under <u>APCo</u> the conditions under which the
13	utility could seek a rate in excess of marginal costs.
14	So that's how I would answer it based on
15	what I have testified to, and I think we can, you
16	know, kind of view it in light of that paradigm,
17	although I find the way he's presented it a bit
18	confusing as far as presentation.
19	BY MR. LANGLEY:
20	Q So would it be your testimony, Ms.
21	Kravtin, that this pole on the screen, which is page
22	40 of Gulf Power Exhibit 42, is more like the national

1	defense than wheat?
2	MR. SEIVER: Objection, Your Honor.
3	JUDGE SIPPEL: I'll sustain that one, yes.
4	MR. LANGLEY: Your Honor, may I be heard
5	on this? One of the key issues in this case is how
6	this concept of rivalrous property applies, and I am
7	entitled to test the parameters of her definition.
8	JUDGE SIPPEL: Yes, but you're trying to
9	peg her into a hole that's been dug by Mr. Bernanke,
10	and I don't think that's fair. I mean, you know, I
11	just don't that's going that's taking it too
12	far.
13	MR. LANGLEY: Well, Your Honor, I will
14	JUDGE SIPPEL: I think she has been very
15	good in terms of going with you as far as she has on
16	this. She has placed pole space some place along this
17	graph.
18	MR. LANGLEY: I will withdraw a placement
19	on the graph and simply restrict the question to this:
20	BY MR. LANGLEY:
21	Q Ms. Kravtin, do you liken the pole
22	depicted in Gulf Power Exhibit 42, page 40, more to

1	the national defense or to wheat?
2	MR. SEIVER: Objection. Same objection,
3	Your Honor.
4	JUDGE SIPPEL: Sustained.
5	BY MR. LANGLEY:
6	Q Ms. Kravtin, if you would, please, turn to
7	page 15 of your testimony.
8	Ms. Kravtin, at the top of page 15 of your
9	direct testimony, there is a header there. Do you see
١٥	that?
.1	A Yes, I do.
L2	Q Is that header a part of your testimony?
L3	A The header we're reading on page 15 of my
L4	testimony?
L5	Q The one that I'm sorry. I didn't mean
L6	to interrupt you so go ahead with what you were
L7	saying.
18	A Well, we're reading it on page 15 of my
L9	testimony, so if your question is, is this text in my
20	testimony, the answer is yes.
21	Q No, I'm asking about the header. Is that
22	part of your testimony, or is that something that your

1	lawyers have inserted?
2	MR. SEIVER: Why don't you identify the
3	line numbers for us so she knows what you're talking
4	about?
5	BY MR. LANGLEY:
6	Q Lines 1 through 3.
7	A The attorneys didn't insert anything in
8	the testimony other than to designate the header
9	"confidential." This is my testimony.
10	Q I was just making sure that that was part
11	of it, that the header was. Because I was going to
12	ask you some questions about it, and if it is
13	something that Mr. Seiver had put in, I didn't want to
14	ask you questions about it. Is that okay?
15	A And I'm answering more generally that all
16	the text in the testimony is my testimony, inclusive
17	of headers.
18	Q Did you write
19	A Other than the one indicating
20	"confidential."
21	Q Did you write this testimony, Ms. Kravtin?
22	A Yes, I did.

1	Q You penned the questions and answers
2	yourself?
3	A Yes, I did.
4	Q Meaning the questions were not posed to
5	you by counsel for the complainants?
6	A That is correct. When I draft testimony,
7	I draft the questions as well.
8	Q So you didn't just give the answers, but
9	you also provided the questions?
10	MR. SEIVER: Objection; asked and
11	answered.
12	JUDGE SIPPEL: Sustained.
13	BY MR. LANGLEY:
14	Q Ms. Kravtin, the header on page 15 reads:
15	"Section 224 of the Communications Act and
16	the FCC rate formula implemented pursuant to section
17	224 reflect economically appropriate cost allocation
18	principles." That is your testimony; correct?
19	A Yes, it is.
20	Q And in saying that, I assume you were
21	including both the cable formula and the telecom
22	formula within that?

1	A Well, my testimony in this proceeding is
2	in regard to the cable rate formula, but certainly the
3	telecom formula is also included in section 224.
4	Q Do you also agree that the telecom formula
5	reflects economically appropriate cost allocation
6	principles?
7	A Yes.
8	Q And you are aware, Ms. Kravtin, that the
9	telecom rate differs somewhat from the cable rate?
10	A Yes, I'm well aware of that.
11	Q And you are aware that the key distinction
12	between the two is that the telecom rate allocates the
13	unusable space equally among the attachers to the
14	pole?
15	A I don't know if I would characterize it
16	that way. I view the two formulas as having different
17	space allocation methodologies for allocating both the
18	usable and unusable space of the pole. Both formulas
19	allocate the usable and unusable space at the pole,
20	but according to a different space allocator
21	methodology.
22	Q But the way the telecom rate allocates

1	unusable space is economically appropriate?
2	A I think I just explained in my prior
3	answer that I didn't agree with the way you're
4	describing the allocation of usable space. There are
5	three parts to both formulas: the investment, the
6	carrying charge, and the space allocator. So where
7	the two formulas differ is in terms of the space
8	factor allocation, the method by which they are
9	allocating the entirety of the pole to either a cable
10	company or a telecom company.
11	Q And right now I'm asking you about the
12	space allocation factor in the telecom rate.
13	A Yes.
14	Q Is that economically appropriate?
15	MR. SEIVER: I'm sorry. For what purpose?
16	Objection. "Economically appropriate" in the world or
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18	MR. LANGLEY: Well, this is her testimony.
19	I'm just asking her questions
20	JUDGE SIPPEL: Well, I'm going to overrule
21	the objection at this point. The witness hasn't
22	indicated that she is having difficulty answering

1	these questions. So, you know, I mean you raised some
2	excellent objections, And I think they have been
3	sustained, but let's see what we can do here.
4	BY MR. LANGLEY:
5	Q Ms. Kravtin, is the way the telecom
6	formula allocates unusable space an economically
7	appropriate cost allocation principle?
8	A I think this is now the third time. The
9	way you are asking me the question, I am not able to
10	answer it because I don't view the telecommunications
11	formula as allocating unusable space different in
12	terms of the space factor allocator is different,
13	but both the cable formula and telecom formula
14	allocate the cost of the total pole, including usable
15	and unusable space.
16	Now if you ask me in terms of what I
17	believe about the space factor allocator in particular
18	and the methodology used in that, then I will try to
19	answer your question.
20	Q That was my question, Ms. Kravtin.
21	A I'm sorry, that's not the way I heard it.
22	I apologize.

Q Is the space allocation factor in the telecom formula an -- does it reflect economically appropriate cost allocation principles?

A Again I testified to, and we had this discussion in deposition, I have testified to this on numerous occasions actually where I have testified on both the use of the telecom formula or the cable formula, is that I believe the appropriate cost allocation principle is to allocate based on usage of the pole.

Now the telecom formula applies a slightly different methodology in the sense that it does include an allocation -coming up the allocator, it includes in that allocation factor some portions, two-thirds of the unusable space divided over the number of attachers. So it's just a different formula of trying to allocate the total cost of the poles. And I believe that a strict usage-based allocator -- again, we are not talking about what the total costs that are being allocated; we are talking about the design of the allocator. I've testified that a strict usage-based allocator is most consistent

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with cost-causation principles.

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In an appropriate world, you know, all the attachers would be charged using a strictly usage-based formula, which is in the cable rate.

I also understand that in the more complex real world and in the context of the Telecommunications Act, where Congress was looking to go to a different paradigm, where there are multiple attachers and trying to encourage telecom competition and all that, whatever, that, you know, they augmented the cable formula to be a little different in the case But I believe that the telecom formula of telecom. generally is more consistent with cost-causation principles than, for example, Gulf's replacement cost methodology, which is producing a rate some 10 times greater than the cable rate.

Certainly the differences between the cable rate and the telecom rate are relatively small compared with these other alternatives. And that is consistent with what I've testified here and what we discussed in deposition, but also other cases where I have testified on the telecom rate and the use of the

1	telecom rate to telecom carriers.
2	Q Is that it? Is that the end of your
3	answer?
4	A Yes.
5	Q Do you need to change your testimony then
6	on page 15 of your prefiled written direct?
7	MR. SEIVER: Objection, Your Honor.
8	JUDGE SIPPEL: Sustained. No I mean I
9	overrule the objection. Go ahead. Go ahead, Mr.
10	Langley.
L1	BY MR. LANGLEY:
12	Q Ms. Kravtin, do you need to change your
13	testimony on paragraph 15 of your direct?
14	A I do not because I testified that I do
15	believe a telecommunications formula is consistent
16	with cost-causation principles. You in your question
17	narrowed me to that space factor allocator. And which
18	I said again is, you know, a matter of degrees, that
19	I believe that a pure space allocator based on sheer
20	usage, straight usage, as in the cable formula, was
21	most consistent with cost causation, but that
22	generally a telecom formula still produced a rate that

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1	was consistent with trying to attribute the cost of a
2	pole, the cost of attachment overall to a factor.
3	So I don't see an inconsistency, nor has
4	the FCC in regulating and implementing both rates, and
5	nor have the courts found that the differences between
6	the two, you know, override the ultimate value, in
7	fact, that both recover more than marginal costs. And
8	both relate generally to cost causation.
9	Q You are offering a legal opinion as to
10	what the courts and the FCC have found?
11	A No, I am not. I am not rendering a legal
12	opinion. I am just citing to the existence of those
13	decisions that specifically address the existence of
14	these two different rates and how they relate to one
15	another.
16	MR. LANGLEY: Your Honor, I'm at a decent
17	stopping point if we need to take our afternoon break,
18	or I can keep going.
19	JUDGE SIPPEL: No, I think the witness has
20	been on the stand long enough. I think we should take
21	a recess, short recess.
22	I just want will you move into another

1	area then?
2	MR. LANGLEY: We will.
3	JUDGE SIPPEL: Thank you.
4	(Laughter.)
5	MR. LANGLEY: Are you riveted, Your Honor?
6	JUDGE SIPPEL: I'm riveted.
7	(Laughter.)
8	JUDGE SIPPEL: This document has been
9	identified, but it's not been moved into evidence. Do
10	you want to move it into evidence at this time?
۱1	MR. LANGLEY: What I had intended to do
12	was move it into the evidence at the end of my cross-
13	examination.
L4	JUDGE SIPPEL: Okay. Just so it doesn't
15	get forgotten.
16	We are in recess until come back at 10
17	minutes of 3. Thank you.
18	(Recess.)
19	JUDGE SIPPEL: We are back on the record.
20	Mr. Langley, continue.
21	BY MR. LANGLEY:
22	Q Ms. Kravtin, are you ready?

1	A I am.
2	Q I want to talk to you a little bit about
3	full market value. Do you have an understanding of
4	what the term full market value means?
5	A Yes, I do.
6	Q Is that what a hypothetical willing buyer
7	would pay a hypothetical willing seller?
8	A As defined in the concept of the general
9	appraisal method of fair market value, yes, whether
10	neither is subject to compulsion to buy or sell.
11	Q And that's the standard fair market value
12	definition, at least?
13	A It's one definition. Obviously the
14	application of it will vary from situation to
15	situation.
16	Q Ms. Kravtin, let's go to page 41 of your
17	written direct testimony. And before I ask you a
18	question about that, the willing buyer-willing seller
19	standard accounts for both sides to the transaction,
20	does it not?
21	JUDGE SIPPEL: I think it's self-evident.
22	MR. LANGLEY: I believe it is, too, Your

1	Honor. I wanted this witness to confirm that.
2	THE WITNESS: Yes, with the addition that
3	I mentioned in terms of neither being under compulsion
4	to buy or sell.
5	BY MR. LANGLEY:
6	Q Ms. Kravtin, on page 41 of your testimony
7	at the top are you there? Do you have your
8	testimony in front of you?
9	A Yes.
10	Q You testify that in a truly competitive
11	market and I'm going to paraphrase, and you can
12	correct me if this is the wrong paraphrase.
13	"In a truly competitive market, prices
14	tend to be bid down to levels approximating marginal
15	costs."
16	Is that correct?
17	A Yes.
18	Q But that isn't a truly competitive market;
19	correct?
20	A Yes.
21	Q And real-world markets out there in the
22	world are not truly competitive, are they?

1	A No, real-world markets aren't going to
2	necessarily fit the theoretical conditions of a truly
3	competitive market, the same as we discussed earlier
4	this morning, that you wouldn't necessarily have that
5	true monopoly, either; that there are conditions.
6	Then you look at the real-world markets and you
7	determine which part of the continuum they most likely
8	fall near.
9	Q And so when you talk about pricing being
LO	bid down toward marginal cost, you are assuming a
L1	market that does not exist?
L2	A I'm not assuming anything. I mean, you
13	know, I'm talking I'm talking about the theoretical
L4	standard for a competitive market.
L5	Q A comparative a competitive market
L6	which does not exist; correct?
L7	A I'm not talking about any specific market.
L8	I'm talking here in terms of theoretical concept.
L9	Q Ms. Kravtin, if you would refer back to
20	what we marked earlier for identification as Gulf
21	Power Exhibit 71. And this is on the second page of
22	that exhibit.

1	A I'm sorry, which page of the exhibit,
2	please?
3	Q It's the second page of that exhibit. And
4	do you see under the heading "Imperfect Competition,"
5	do you see that heading?
6	A Yes.
7	Q Would you read, please, the first sentence
8	underneath that heading?
9	MR. SEIVER: Your Honor, could I just make
10	an objection, as I did before, to allow the witness to
11	look at as much of she needs of this before any
12	questions are asked?
13	JUDGE SIPPEL: If you want the witness to
14	read to herself before she answers.
15	MR. LANGLEY: Are you asking Mr. Seiver?
16	JUDGE SIPPEL: I'm asking you.
17	MR. LANGLEY: I don't want her to read
18	anything to herself. I want her to read the first
19	sentence underneath "Imperfect Competition."
20	JUDGE SIPPEL: All right. I'll overrule
21	the objection.
22	THE WITNESS: Sure.

1	"The perfectly competitive market is an
2	ideal. The actual markets we encounter in every-day
3	life differ from the ideal in varying degrees."
4	BY MR. LANGLEY:
5	Q You agree with that statement?
6	A Yes. I believe that's consistent with the
7	answer I just gave.
8	Q And there are different forms of imperfect
9	competition, aren't there?
10	A Well, can you explain what you mean by
11	forms?
12	Q Well, how about with reference to the
13	second page of Gulf Power Exhibit 71?
14	MR. SEIVER: Objection, Your Honor. If we
15	are going to go through and have this witness somehow
16	or other authenticate this exhibit that she has not
17	seen before today, and we don't have Mr. Bernanke
18	here, I think we are spending a lot of time developing
19	an economic analysis for him without his own witness.
20	MR. LANGLEY: Your Honor, we don't need
21	Mr. Bernanke here to authenticate this. This is a
22	learned treatise which is admissible under the Federal

1	Rules of Evidence.
2	JUDGE SIPPEL: Well, it's only being used
3	for purposes of really purposes of cross-
4	examination. Again, it's a question of I'm giving
5	leeway on both sides. It's cross-examination, and
6	it's a question of degree. If you let him get on and
7	off with this, if he you know, if it takes too
8	long, then I'm going to stop it. But let's see if we
9	can get going.
10	I'm going to overrule the objection. Go
11	ahead.
12	BY MR. LANGLEY:
13	Q Ms. Kravtin, down in the middle of the
14	section underneath "Different Forms of Imperfect
15	Competition," do you see where it describes
16	monopolistic competition?
17	A Yes, and coincidentally it's talking about
18	a power and light company.
19	Q Would you read that sentence, please? The
20	one that begins "Closer still to perfect competition."
21	A I'm sorry, I'm looking at "perfect
22	monopoly, " "competitive ideals of pure monopoly."

1	Are you in the next paragraph?
2	Q I'm two paragraphs down in the middle of
3	the section entitled "Different Forms of Imperfect
4	Competition."
5	A The second paragraph in that section?
6	Q Correct.
7	A Monopoly. Okay.
8	Q Beginning with the sentence "Closer
9	still." Beginning with the words "closer still."
LO	A Oh, yes, in the middle of that second
L1	paragraph.
12	"Closer still to perfect competition is
L3	the industry structure known as monopolistic
L 4	competition, which typically consists of a relatively
L5	large number of firms that sell the same product with
L6	slight differentiations."
L7	Q And, Ms. Kravtin, is that, in your
L8	understanding as an economist, the closest real thing
L9	to true competition?
20	MR. SEIVER: Objection to form. What is
21	close?
22	JUDGE SIPPEL: If she knows. I take it it

1	is what she read.
2	MR. SEIVER: Oh.
3	JUDGE SIPPEL: I this is not going to
4	help, Mr. Seiver. I mean it's going to be much more
5	painless.
6	MR. SEIVER: All right, Your Honor.
7	JUDGE SIPPEL: I don't want to say let
8	me stop right there. Go ahead.
9	Can you answer? Is there a question?
LO	THE WITNESS: Could you repeat your
L1	question, please?
L2	BY MR. LANGLEY:
L3	Q Is monopolistic competition the closest
L4	thing to true, perfect competition?
L5	A No, I wouldn't say so.
L6	Q That exists in the real world, at least?
L7	A No, I stand by my answer.
L8	Q Can you give us an example of something
L9	that is more competitive?
20	A Well, in the real world in which we
21	operate and I testified to this on numerous
22	occasions when I have done a market analysis you

1	have these theoretical ideas, as Dr. Bernanke is
2	saying talking about, to the truly competitive
3	ideal. The monopoly ideal. And then you have all
4	different forms, really, continuing in between of
5	which monopolistic competition I would place probably
6	somewhere in the center. So you have more or less if
7	you did some sort of diagram, as we economists like to
8	do, you know, you would have a continuum closer to
9	truly competitive. And I tend to call that in my work
10	more effectively or workably competitive.
11	So that's how I would describe it in my
12	words. That you have a continuum and that you have
13	many types of market conditions. You have to look to
14	the specific facts and circumstances of that market in
15	terms of where you place it on this idealistic
16	continuum that defined the theoretical states.
17	Q And monopolistic competition falls about
18	in the middle?
19	A No, in that midrange closer to
20	competitive. You would have then oliogopolistic,
21	which I presume you will talk about, although I
22	haven't read past where you directed me. But then you